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The Proposed U.S.-Panama Free Trade Agreement 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] On June 28, 2007, after two and a half years of negotiation, the United States and Panama 
signed a reciprocal free trade agreement (FTA). Negotiations were formally concluded on December 16, 
2006, with an understanding that further changes to labor, environment, and intellectual property rights 
(IPR) chapters would be made pursuant to future detailed congressional input. These changes were 
agreed to in late June 2007, in time for the FTA to be considered under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) 
legislation before it expired on July 1, 2007. TPA allows Congress to consider trade implementing bills 
under expedited procedures. Panama’s legislature approved the FTA 58 to 4 on July 11, 2007. Neither the 
110th nor the 111th Congress took up the agreement. 
The proposed U.S.-Panama FTA is a comprehensive agreement. Some 88% of U.S. commercial and 
industrial exports would become duty-free upon implementation, with remaining tariffs phased out over a 
10-year period. Over 60% of U.S. farm exports to Panama also would achieve immediate duty-free status, 
with tariffs and tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on select farm products to be phased out by year 17 of the 
agreement (year 20 for rice). Panama and the United States signed a separate bilateral agreement on 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) issues that would recognize U.S. food safety inspection as equivalent to 
Panamanian standards, which will expedite entry of U.S. meat and poultry exports. The FTA also 
consummates understandings on telecommunications, services trade, government procurement, 
investment, and intellectual property rights. 
The circumstances framing the proposed U.S.-Panama FTA differ considerably from those of two other 
signed FTAs that have yet to be considered by Congress. The deep concerns that Congress has 
expressed over Colombia’s violence have not been an issue in the Panama FTA debate, which is framed 
more by the positive image of a long-standing strategic bilateral relationship based on Panama’s canal. 
Nor does Panama compare well with the continuing debate over the proposed FTA with South Korea, 
which as a major U.S. trading partner, can affect key industries such as automobile and beef production. 
To the contrary, Panama trades little with the United States, even by Latin American standards, and so 
although particular industries may be affected to some degree, and U.S. investment is relatively important 
in Panama, the FTA cannot have a major effect on the U.S. economy as a whole. 
The final text of the proposed U.S.-Panama FTA incorporates amendments on key issues based on 
congressional input in 2007. The most significant were adoption of enforceable labor standards, 
compulsory adherence to select multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), and an easing of 
restrictions on developing country access to generic drugs. In these cases, the proposed U.S.- Panama 
FTA goes beyond provisions in existing bilateral FTAs and multilateral trade rules. Congress is still 
debating two major issues: labor and tax transparency. Concerns over Panama’s labor code have been 
addressed by legislation in Panama, yet to be enacted. One issue on minimum workers needed to form a 
union has not been addressed for the apparent lack of support even among labor groups in Panama. 
Congress also requires that Panama amend its tax laws to incorporate changes necessary to implement 
the recently signed Tax Information and Exchange Agreement (TIEA), which would provide greater 
transparency in support of curbing money laundering related to drug trafficking. Legislation has been 
passed, but work remains to be done on a few bills, including a final vote on approving the TIEA. It 
remains to be seen if these final changes will be sufficient for the FTA to be approved by a majority in the 
U.S. Congress. 
Keywords 
Panama, free trade agreement, FTA, trade, Congress, legislation 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Hornbeck, J. F. (2011). The Proposed U.S.-Panama Free Trade Agreement [Electronic version]. 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/814 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/814 
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress        
 
 
The Proposed U.S.-Panama Free Trade 
Agreement 
J. F. Hornbeck 
Specialist in International Trade and Finance 
April 13, 2011 
Congressional Research Service
7-5700 
www.crs.gov 
RL32540 
The Proposed U.S.-Panama Free Trade Agreement 
 
Congressional Research Service 
Summary 
On June 28, 2007, the United States and Panama signed a reciprocal free trade agreement (FTA). 
Negotiations were formally concluded on December 16, 2006, with an understanding that further 
changes to labor, environment, investment, and intellectual property rights (IPR) chapters would 
be made pursuant to future detailed congressional input. These changes were agreed to in late 
June 2007, in time for the FTA to be considered under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) 
legislation before it expired on July 1, 2007. TPA allows Congress to consider trade implementing 
bills under expedited procedures. Panama’s legislature approved the FTA 58 to 4 on July 11, 
2007. Neither the 110th nor the 111th Congress took up the agreement. 
The proposed U.S.-Panama FTA is a comprehensive agreement. Some 88% of U.S. commercial 
and industrial exports would become duty-free upon implementation, with remaining tariffs 
phased out over a 10-year period. Over 60% of U.S. farm exports to Panama also would achieve 
immediate duty-free status, with tariffs and tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on select farm products to be 
phased out by year 17 of the agreement (year 20 for rice). Panama and the United States signed a 
separate bilateral agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) issues that would recognize U.S. 
food safety inspection as equivalent to Panamanian standards, which will expedite entry of U.S. 
meat and poultry exports. The FTA also consummates understandings on telecommunications, 
services trade, government procurement, investment, and intellectual property rights. 
The circumstances framing the proposed U.S.-Panama FTA differ considerably from those of two 
other signed FTAs that have yet to be considered by Congress. The deep concerns that Congress 
has expressed over Colombia’s violence have not been an issue in the Panama FTA debate, which 
is framed more by the positive image of a long-standing strategic bilateral relationship based on 
Panama’s canal. Nor does Panama compare well with the continuing debate over the proposed 
FTA with South Korea, which as a major U.S. trading partner, can affect key industries such as 
automobile and beef production. To the contrary, Panama trades little with the United States, even 
by Latin American standards, and most exports already enter the United States duty free, so 
although particular industries could be affected to some degree, and U.S. investment is relatively 
important in Panama, the FTA cannot have a major effect on the U.S. economy as a whole. 
The final text of the proposed U.S.-Panama FTA incorporates amendments based on the May 10, 
2007, bipartisan agreement crafted by the Bush Administration and leadership in the 110th 
Congress. These include adoption of enforceable labor standards, compulsory membership in 
multilateral environmental agreements, and an easing of restrictions on developing country access 
to generic drugs, provisions that go beyond those in existing bilateral FTAs and multilateral trade 
rules. Two issues remain: labor and tax transparency. All but one labor concern was addressed 
with passage of legislation in Panama on March 30, 2011. The minimum workers needed to form 
a union has not been addressed for the lack of support even among labor groups in Panama. 
Congress has also required that Panama to incorporate changes into its laws necessary to 
implement the recently signed Tax Information and Exchange Agreement (TIEA), which would 
provide greater transparency in support of curbing money laundering activities related to drug 
trafficking. Much of the legislation has been completed, but the National Assembly has not taken 
a final vote on ratifying the TIEA. It remains to be seen if these final changes will be sufficient 
for the FTA to be approved by a majority in the U.S. Congress. 
For more on Panama, see CRS Report RL30981, Panama: Political and Economic Conditions 
and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan. 
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n June 28, 2007, the United States and Panama signed a free trade agreement (FTA) after 
two and a half years and 10 rounds of negotiations (see Appendix A for a chronology of 
events). Negotiations formally concluded on December 16, 2006, with an understanding 
that changes to labor, environment, and intellectual property rights (IPR) chapters would be made 
pursuant to future congressional input. These changes were agreed to in late June 2007 and the 
FTA was signed in time to be considered under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation, 
which expired on July 1, 2007. TPA allows Congress to consider certain trade implementing bills 
under expedited procedures.1 Panama’s legislature ratified the FTA 58 to 4 on July 11, 2007. 
Implementing legislation was not introduced in either the 110th or the 111th Congress. 
Background and Recent Developments 
Congressional action on the proposed U.S.-Panama FTA has been delayed over numerous 
concerns since it was signed four years ago. The 112th Congress, however, has turned its attention 
to consideration of the U.S.-Panama FTA, with the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance 
Committees holding a series of hearings.2 Many issues were addressed by changes to the FTA 
based on principles outlined in the May 10, 2007, bipartisan agreement, crafted jointly by 
leadership in the 110th Congress and the Bush Administration. These changes include adoption as 
fully enforceable commitments, the five basic labor rights defined in the International Labor 
Organization’s (ILO) Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up (1998) 
Declaration, select multilateral environmental agreements, new pharmaceutical intellectual 
property rights provisions intended to facilitate Panama’s access to generic drugs, and language 
on the investor-state issue clarifying that foreign investors will have no greater rights than U.S. 
domestic investors with respect to investment dispute resolution under the FTA. 
Other issues, however, cropped up that further hindered congressional action on the agreement, 
virtually all falling outside the scope of the FTA. Soon after the May 10 principles were agreed to, 
the September 3, 2007 election of Pedro Miguel González Pinzón as president of Panama’s 
National Assembly resulted in another year of delay.3 Although a deputy in the National 
Assembly since 1999, his election to the head of the National Assembly raised his profile and 
drew the attention of Congress to his alleged role in the June 10, 1992 murder of a U.S. 
serviceman in Panama. A Panamanian court acquitted him of the charge in 1997, but the United 
States does not recognize the verdict and maintains an outstanding warrant for his arrest.4 This 
issue was effectively resolved with respect to the FTA on September 1, 2008, when González 
Pinzón declined to run for a second term as president of the National Assembly. 
                                                             
 
1
 For details, see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy, 
by J. F. Hornbeck and William H. Cooper. 
2
 See also, Washington Trade Daily, "The Three FTAs and Congress," February 16, 2011, and H.Res. 86 and S.Res. 20, 
both calling for passage of the Panama, South Korea, and Colombia FTAs. 
3
 Inside U.S. Trade. Committee Chairs Signal FTA Problem Over Panama Assembly Head. September 21, 2007. 
4
 U.S. Department of State. Press Statement. Election of Panamanian National Assembly President Pedro Miguel 
González-Pinzón. September 1, 2007. 
O 
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Since 2008, two other issues arose, the first dealing with additional changes to the Panamanian 
labor code, the second related to tax transparency issues, particularly with respect to money 
laundering concerns. 
Labor Code Amendments 
Despite the FTA’s adoption of new labor principles based on the May 10, 2007, agreement, at the 
start of the 112th Congress, four Panamanian labor code issues remained outstanding. First, the 
labor code prohibited Panamanian workers from striking against companies that had been in 
business for less than two years. Second, export processing zones were covered by separate labor 
provisions with more restrictive collective bargaining and right to strike language than existed as 
part of the national labor code. The National Assembly addressed both issues with passage of bill 
276 on March 30, 2011. The statute removed language that disallowed strikes on companies less 
than two years old and changed the labor code covering export processing zones so that it would 
conform to language in the national labor code with respect to collective bargaining and the right 
to strike. The law also created a new department in the Ministry of Labor to oversee export 
processing zones.5 
A third labor issue was Law 29, which created the Baru Special Economic Zone. This statute 
provided investment incentives for companies willing to locate in a former banana plantation. 
Two initiatives were controversial: a six-year moratorium on collective bargaining rights and the 
extension from two to three years in the use of temporary workers. Following discussions with 
the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the Panamanian National Assembly struck these 
two provisions with passage of bill 323 on March 30, 2011.6 A fourth labor issue involves the 
statutory limitation on the minimum number of workers required to start a union. Panama 
requires 40, the ILO recommends 20. This issue has been highlighted by the State Department 
and has drawn the attention of some Members of Congress.7 The Panamanian government has not 
acted on the so-called “40/20 Issue” because there is no support for changing the law by business, 
government, or labor constituencies in Panama. 
Tax Transparency 
Historically, the United States has had an ongoing concern over problems with drug trafficking 
and money laundering through Panama.8 Panama’s efforts in this area have improved over time, 
but critics still point to the need for further control of illegal transactions. Panama remains on the 
so-called “Gray List” maintained by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), which includes jurisdictions that have committed to an internationally-
agreed tax standard, but have yet to implement it.9 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
                                                             
 
5
 Correspondence with Embassy of Panama, March 25 and April 8, 2011. 
6
 Discussion with Embassy of Panama, April 8, 2011. 
7
 U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights: 
Panama. Washington, D.C. April 8, 2011. 
8
 For more details, see, CRS Report RL30981, Panama: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations, by 
Mark P. Sullivan. 
9
 This standard “requires exchange of information on request in all tax matters for the administration and enforcement 
(continued...) 
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also listed Panama as one of 50 countries described as having “tax havens” or “financial privacy 
jurisdictions” according to a number of international organizations, and until recently Panama has 
declined to enter into any agreements for the exchange of tax information.10 
Although this issue falls outside the purview of the FTA, some Members of Congress wanted to 
delay consideration of the FTA until Panama signed a Tax Information and Exchange Agreement 
(TIEA) with the United States, and took other measures necessary to be removed from the OECD 
“Gray List,” including implementing tax agreements with a minimum of 12 other countries.11 
Panama has made progress in achieving both goals. Panama and the United States came to a 
resolution on the tax transparency issue on November 30, 2010, when they signed a TIEA. The 
TIEA permits either country to request information on most types of federal (U.S.) or national 
(Panama) taxes, a major policy response to the possible use of Panama as a haven for tax evasion. 
Article 7 specifically allows for tax information exchange “under the existing Treaty on Mutual 
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,” which covers money laundering among other illicit 
activities. As provided in the Joint Declaration to the TIEA, however, the agreement does not 
enter into force until Panama has enacted legislation necessary to comply fully with the 
agreement. The TIEA was voted out of the president’s cabinet on January 18, 2011 and has been 
sent to the National Assembly, where it is expected to receive prompt attention. 
In addition and prior to signing the TIEA, Panama enacted legislation in June 2010 that amended 
the tax code and effectively created the legal framework to (1) provide the authority for the 
minister of foreign relations and the Tax Office to implement the TIEA, (2) establish the 
necessary offices, regulations, and procedures, and (3) carry out obligations under the agreement. 
These legislative changes allow Panama to ratify taxation agreements with other countries, 
including the TIEA with the United States. 
Another important step occurred on February 1, 2011, when Panama signed into law a provision 
covering the “Bearer Shares” or “Know Your Client” provisions required under the TIEA. A 
bearer share is a security that is wholly owned by whoever holds the physical certificate. The 
issuing firm neither registers the owner, nor does it track transfers of ownership. The company 
disperses dividends on bearer shares when a physical coupon is presented to the firm. Because the 
share is not registered to any authority, transferring the ownership involves only delivering the 
physical document. Bearer shares are typically international securities and lack the regulation and 
control of common shares because ownership is never recorded. The TIEA provision requires 
                                                             
(...continued) 
 
of domestic tax law without regard to a domestic tax interest requirement or bank secrecy for tax purposes.” Progress 
Report on the Jurisdictions Surveyed by the OECD Global Forum in Implementing the International Agreed Tax 
Standard, February 18, 2011. The standard has been endorsed by the G20 Finance Ministers and the United Nations 
Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters. 
10
 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). International Taxation: Large U.S. Corporations and 
Federal Contractors with Subsidiaries in Jurisdictions Listed as Tax Havens or Financial Privacy Jurisdictions. GAO-
09-157. December 2008. 
11
 So-called “partners of relevance.” Inside U.S. Trade. Administration Signals Panama Issues Not Major FTA 
Obstacles. March 13, 2009, and Schatz, Joseph J. Pending Panama Trade Agreement No Sure Thing as Opponents 
Mobilize. CQ Today. March 11, 2009. p. 6. Panama agreed to implement the OECD tax standard in 2002 through tax 
information and exchange agreements, but delayed entering into any such agreements until 2011. 
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owner identification of bearer shares, and that such information be provided to the United States 
Government upon request.12 
Implementation of the TIEA will require that Panama set up new offices and procedures. 
Currently, Panama is in the early stages of creating a new International Tax Unit and Unit for the 
International Exchange of Tax Information in the Directorate General of Income. These offices 
will coordinate and respond to requests for tax information under the TIEA and various double 
taxation agreements. Panama is adopting OECD guidelines for these offices with Spain providing 
technical assistance on computer software, procedures development, and possibly other areas.13 
To address the “Gray List” issue, Panama has entered into 13 double taxation agreements in 
addition to the TIEA with the United States (see Table 1). Unlike the TIEA, the purpose of the 
double taxation agreements is to eliminate double taxation in addition to taking on obligations of 
tax information and exchange as set out by the OECD international tax standard. Panama has set 
an internal deadline of concluding all these agreements and having its name removed from the 
“Gray List” by June 2011.14 
Table 1. Legislative Status of Double Taxation Agreements Entered Into by Panama 
Legislative Status Countries 
Signed and ratified Mexico, Barbados, and Portugal 
Signed, presented to National Assembly Qatar, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, South Korea, Italy 
Finalized, awaiting formal signing France, Belgium, and Ireland 
Source: Embassy of Panama, as of April 8, 2011. 
Panama’s Canal and Economic Relations with the 
United States 
The United States and Panama have entered into many agreements over the past 150 years, the 
most prominent ones defining their relative stakes in the canal that traverses the Central American 
isthmus, bisecting Panamanian territory. The canal has been a critical factor influencing 
Panamanian domestic and foreign affairs, and like earlier U.S.-Panama agreements, the FTA’s 
significance is tied to a Panamanian economy that has formed largely around the canal. 
                                                             
 
12
 As defined in the Joint Declaration of the TIEA, “The United States understands that such legislation will require 
resident agents acting for Panamanian entities to obtain and maintain in their records information sufficient to identify 
the owners of those entities, even in cases in which shares of those entities are issued in bearer form, including, where 
the owner is a legal person, information sufficient to identify substantial owners of that legal person.” 
13
 Discussions with Embassy of Panama, March 1 and 25, 2011. 
14
 Correspondence with Embassy of Panama, February 7, 2011. 
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Early U.S.-Panama Economic Relations 
Since first explored by the Spanish at the turn of the 16th century, interest in Panama has centered 
on its unique geographic characteristic: the slender distance separating the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans (see Figure 1). Because of the transit possibilities this presented (first for Peruvian gold 
and other colonial trade), Panama was a natural crossroads for the movement of commerce, a 
strategic position that grew as the world became ever more traveled and integrated. In fact, 
Panama’s destiny became fused to its geography and the foreign interests that sought to take 
advantage of it, particularly the United States. 
Panama was swept to independence from Spain on November 28, 1821, becoming part of the 
Gran Colombia regional group. By this point, both the United States and Britain had openly 
coveted the prospect of an inter-oceanic connector. Well before construction of a canal could 
begin, the United States displaced Britain as the dominant foreign influence and completed a 
cross-isthmian railroad in 1855. This project was driven by the westward expansion of the United 
States, which included an anticipated southern water route to the west coast. To secure this transit 
system, as well as the safety of goods and people using it, the United States resorted to armed 
intervention in Panama some 14 times in the 19th century. By the time the United States sought 
permission to construct a canal, a precedent had already been set to use military force for defense 
of U.S. interests in Panama.15 
The U.S. effort to build a canal required a concession from Colombia that would allow the United 
States to complete the bankrupt French project abandoned in 1889. In early 1903, the details were 
set down in a treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate, but unanimously rejected by the Colombian 
legislature. The United States responded by reaching out to the growing Panamanian secessionist 
movement. On November 3, 1903, in a quick and bloodless move encouraged by the offshore 
presence of U.S. warships, Panama separated from Colombia. The United States immediately 
recognized Panama as an independent state, and in return, Panama signed the Hay-Buneau-Varilla 
Treaty, ceding to the United States the rights to construct a canal and control it “in perpetuity.”16 
The Panama Canal opened in 1914, leading to U.S. dominance in the economic and, at times, 
political life of Panama. Although both countries benefitted from its operations, the relationship 
was far from equal, which along with the perpetual U.S. presence, generated a nagging 
resentment, frequent protests, and periodic violence over the tangible loss of national sovereignty. 
This tension remained a dominant feature of U.S.-Panamanian relations until the canal was ceded 
back to Panama in 1977 under terms defined in the Panama Canal Treaties signed by Presidents 
Jimmy Carter and Omar Torrijos. Tensions flared again in 1989 when the U.S. military invaded 
Panama to arrest then-chief of state General Manual Noriega on narcotics trafficking charges and 
for threatening U.S. personnel and property. The incursion, nonetheless, proved to be a catalyst 
for the return of democracy. Panama’s decision to promote trade liberalization soon followed.17
                                                             
 
15
 Michael L. Conniff, Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance, 2nd ed. (Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 2001), pp. 30-35. 
16
 Ralph Lee Woodward, Central America: A Nation Divided, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 
63-70. 
17
 Conniff, Panama and the United States, pp. 134-39 and CRS Report RL30981, Panama: Political and Economic 
Conditions and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan. 
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Figure 1. Map of Panama 
 
Source: CRS. 
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The Canal and U.S. Trade Policy 
The canal solidified Panama as a maritime economy and its return to Panamanian control raised 
expectations of greater economic benefits from its ownership. The canal operations by themselves 
account for approximately 6% of Panama’s GDP, with the largest and fastest growing traffic 
volume generated along the U.S. East Coast-to-Asia trade route (especially U.S.-China). About 
one-third of all cargo passing through the canal has its origin or destination in the United States. 
The canal’s total economic impact, however, is far greater, supporting income and jobs in various 
services industries including warehousing, ship registry and repair, salvage operations, insurance, 
banking, and tourism. The two major ports at either end of the canal have been privatized and 
modernized, and a portion of the canal was widened in 2001, but Panama faces a difficult and 
expensive challenge to enhance the capacity of the entire canal to accommodate much larger post-
Panamax ships.18 Panama held a national referendum on the proposed $5.25 billion expansion on 
October 22, 2006. It passed by a wide margin and Panama has begun the expansion project. 
With transfer of the canal and its operations to Panama, the country also inherited a substantial 
amount of land and physical assets. The conversion of these assets to private use has been a boon 
to the Panamanian economy, but not without considerable costs and investment, as well. 
Privatization efforts eased the transformation of former U.S. government facilities to productive 
Panamanian use, which has included refurbishing the Panamanian railroad by Kansas City 
Southern Railways, transforming the former Albrook base into residential housing, and 
developing a small foreign processing zone in the former Ft. Davis.19 
The Panama-Pacific Special Economic Area (PPSEA) is perhaps the most ambitious of these 
projects. This public-private partnership, established in law, aspires to convert the former Howard 
Air Force Base into a “world class business center,” with an emphasis on the export sector. 
Existing assets include housing and office buildings, a hospital, transportation infrastructure, fiber 
optic cable network, an 8,500-foot runway, and four hangar facilities. The government offers 
businesses various fiscal incentives and a streamlined regulatory process. Firms are required to 
commit to state-of-the-art practices that include adopting internationally accepted environmental 
and labor standards.20 
With the assistance of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank, Panama is 
relying on a large global financing package to cover the initial investment needs. The project aims 
at developing various businesses including computer technology, cell phone manufacturing, 
international call centers (Dell already operates one on site), aeronautical industry support, and 
others that require a well-trained work force. The IFC supports this project not only for its 
prospects as a business venture, but because it is forward looking rather than relying on the 
“maquiladora” business model common in much of the region.21 
                                                             
 
18
 The Economist Intelligence Unit. Panama: Country Profile 2003. London, 2003. pp. 16-17 and U.S. Department of 
Energy. Energy Information Administration. Panama: Country Analysis Briefs. October 2003; and 
http://www.pancanal.com. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Government of Panama. Panama-Pacifico Special Economic Area Agency. 
21
 Ibid., and discussion with IFC official. 
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At the start of the 21st century, the canal and close ties with the United States are still defining 
features of Panama’s economy, but in the past these traits have hindered Panama’s participation in 
regional integration. Although part of the Central American Integration System, a broadly focused 
political arrangement, Panama has declined to join the Central American Common Market, 
relying instead on the canal and the large U.S. economy as its economic anchors. Panama has had 
a fully dollarized monetary system since independence and is a beneficiary of U.S. unilateral 
trade preferences defined in the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), the 
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), and the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP).22 These historical circumstances have given Panama little incentive to become a more 
open economy. Only since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1997 did Panama 
begin to reduce tariff rates, an important step in preparation for an FTA with the United States. 
Panama’s subregional independence and reliance on U.S. economic ties has suited the United 
States as well, given its continuing interest in the canal. An FTA with Panama may be seen as one 
way for the United States to support long-established commercial interests and deepen bilateral 
relations, particularly if accepted as a mutually beneficial pact with reasonably balanced political 
and economic outcomes. Although many ships have outgrown the canal, its locale and prospects 
for enlarging the passageway continue to reinforce Panama’s historic, albeit currently diminished, 
importance for the United States as a strategic trade passage. 
A bilateral FTA with Panama also supported the Bush Administration’s “competitive 
liberalization” trade strategy, in which negotiations were pursued simultaneously on multilateral, 
regional, and bilateral levels. This multi-tiered strategy is predicated on an expectation that gains 
on one level of negotiation may encourage, if not compel, breakthroughs on others. Because of 
slow progress on the WTO Doha Round and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), this 
strategy played out through aggressive bilateral trade negotiations, of which the proposed Panama 
FTA is one. Some, however, have questioned the bilateral approach for the asymmetrical 
negotiation power the United States wields, the negative effects it may have on non-participating 
countries, and the one-sided trading system that could be developing around a U.S. hub, as 
opposed to a truly large regional or multilateral system. 
For Panama, the proposed FTA reinforces its many trade policy goals and supports continued 
U.S. foreign direct investment. The services sector is already globally competitive, but the 
manufacturing sector is small and the agricultural sector remains protected and uncompetitive 
(see below). For Panama, the chief concern was crafting an FTA that would balance the need to 
pursue openness for services, export growth and promotion for manufacturing, and adjustment 
time for agriculture to become more competitive, while minimizing social displacement. The 
incentive to negotiate was perhaps also enhanced by the desire to keep pace with other Latin 
American countries that already have or are negotiating FTAs with the United States. 
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Panamanian Trade Relations 
Panama is a country of 3.5 million people with a stable, diversified economy that has experienced 
strong growth despite the current global economic downturn. Panama’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) expanded by an annual average of over 9% for the five years ending 2008, and even with 
the global recession, grew by 2.4% in 2009. The economy is estimated to grow by 6.3% in 2010 
(see Appendix B for selected macroeconomic data). Panama has the highest per capita income in 
the Central American region, but income distribution is highly skewed; poverty remains a 
nagging problem, especially in rural areas; and the unemployment rate has been moderately high. 
Inflation rose significantly in 2007-2008, but retreated in 2009 with the diminished growth in 
economic output. Unlike any other Latin American country, 77% of Panama’s GDP is in services, 
developed around the transportation and commerce generated by canal traffic and the Colón Free 
Zone (CFZ). Industry is the second-most important sector, contributing 17% to GDP, followed by 
agriculture, contributing 6% to GDP.23 
Structure and Direction of Panamanian Trade 
Trade is an increasingly important part of this largely services-based economy, but as seen in 
Table 2, Panama has a historically large merchandise trade deficit, exporting relatively little 
compared to the amount of goods it imports. From 2001 to 2009, Panama’s annual merchandise 
trade deficits ranged from $700 million to $4.7 billion. Panama’s declining terms of trade are one 
factor affecting the trade balance (see Appendix B), but the large increases in 2007 and 2008 
reflect two developments. First, a large rise in oil imports driven by price and quantity, and an 
increase in construction machinery imports (derricks, dozers, cranes, etc.) related to Panama’s 
strong economic growth, canal expansion, and other infrastructure investment. In most years, the 
merchandise deficit has been offset by a services trade surplus, which has ranged from $900 
million in 2001 to $3.3 billion in 2009. Such a large services component of the balance of 
payments is unusual for a Latin American country, but reflects the unique aspects of the 
Panamanian economy. Large merchandise trade deficits may continue as long as energy and food 
prices remain high and as the canal expansion accelerates. 
Table 2. Panama’s Current Account Balance 
(U.S. $ millions) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 Merchandise Trade Balance -696 -1,035 -1,202 -1,537 -1,558 -1,712 -3,190 -4,546 -2,026 
 Services Trade Balance 890 968 1,240 1,337 1,420 2,273 2,836 3,205 3,272 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean. Estudio económico de 
América Latina y el Caribe, 2009-2010, July 2010. p. 222. 
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Panama’s trade policy emphasizes increased exports as a driver of economic growth, pointing to 
the Panama Pacific Special Economic Area, Colón Free Zone (see below), and to a lesser extent, 
the small export processing zones and nontraditional agricultural products as opportunities to 
execute this vision. Panama is a global trader and since 2002 has ratified FTAs with Chile, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Singapore, 
and Taiwan. It has signed agreements with Canada (ratified by Panama) and has an Association 
(limited) agreement with Central America and the European Union. Negotiations are in process 
with Colombia, Peru, and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries. Panama has 
also expressed interest in negotiating agreements with South Korea, the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) countries, and Gulf Cooperation Council.24 
Figure 2. Panama Direction of Trade, 2009 
 
Source: CRS from Global Trade Atlas data. 
In 2009, the United States accounted for 42.6% of Panamanian exports and 29.1% of its imports 
(see Figure 2). The EU is the second largest export market with a 20.7% export share, but 
accounts for only 6.4% of Panamanian imports. The Latin American countries collectively are 
Panama’s third-largest export market with 20.1% share of the total, and have a 23.1% import 
share. Panamanian trade has two distinct elements of importance on the import side. Nearly 12% 
of imports entered Panama through the Colon Free Zone (CFZ), discussed in detail below. In 
addition, another 14.0% of oil imports entered through the Oil Import Zone (OIZ). Most of these 
imports originated in the United States, Latin America, and the Caribbean. 
Panama is closely tied to the United States as its dominant trading partner, and is one of the few 
Latin American countries with which the United States has a merchandise trade surplus. Although 
relatively small, it is by far the largest in the region. Panama runs a sizeable trade deficit with 
Latin America. Its largest Latin American trade partners are Costa Rica, Mexico, and Colombia. 
Panama also imports significant quantities of oil from Trinidad and Tobago. Asia accounts for 
7.4% of Panama’s exports, but 12.7% of its imports, dominated by China, Japan, and South 
Korea. 
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The Colón Free Zone 
A distinct feature of Panama’s trade regime is the Colón Free Zone (CFZ), which with the 
exception of Hong Kong is the largest duty free zone in the world. The vast trade volume that 
traverses the Panama Canal, multimodal transportation infrastructure, modern financial sector, 
and Panama’s central location in the Americas make Colón a logical, if not ideal, place for a duty 
free zone. It serves as a “one stop shop” for both Latin American buyers and sellers from the rest 
of the world, including Asia and the United States. Sellers operate showrooms targeted at small- 
and medium-sized buyers, who make wholesale purchases of goods for retail sale in their 
respective countries. Goods are typically repackaged in smaller lots, priced in the local market 
currency, and transferred to the purchasing country without incurring income, value added, or 
transfer taxes. Most CFZ trade is in electronics, clothing, jewelry, and other luxury goods. 
Buyers benefit from the ability to purchase in small lots, reduced travel costs, consolidated 
shipping, improved shipping times, and credit offered by sellers. The sellers benefit from 
reaching smaller Latin American markets in one location and reduced tax and transaction costs. 
Panama benefits from the 20,000 direct jobs the CFZ creates and the public revenue they 
generate. CFZ trade is reported as a separate component of Panama’s trade statistics and only 
those goods entering the Panamanian economy are recorded as imports. In 2008, CFZ trade added 
a net $807 million to the Panamanian trade balance.25 
The CFZ is frequently associated with a number of illicit activities including money laundering, 
illegal transshipment, and trademark and other intellectual property violations. In part, this is a 
reputation that Panama as a whole has been fighting since the military dictatorship, which was 
widely known for its flagrant disrespect of the law, if not outright corruption. Panama’s proximity 
to Colombia and headquarters as a transshipment point helped fuel this perception. 
The CFZ has attempted to counter this reputation. The zone itself is an enclosed commercial area, 
encircled by and under the supervision of, customs and other law enforcement agencies of the 
Republic of Panama. In addition, both the Colón Free Zone User’s Association and the CFZ 
Administration have a strict code of conduct and argue that illicit activity is also policed by 
individual companies because a bad reputation hurts those dedicated to making the CFZ a world 
class trading center. Even the accusation of an infraction can lead to a suspension of the license 
needed to operate in the zone. Cash accounts for only 10% of transactions and there is careful 
monitoring of all goods that move in and out of the zone through electronic tracking systems.26 
U.S.-Panama Merchandise Trade 
U.S.-Panamanian merchandise trade is small, as seen in Table 3.27 In 2010, the United States 
exported $6,068 million worth of goods and imported $379 million, producing a U.S. trade 
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surplus of $5,690 million, the largest in the Western Hemisphere. Still, Panama ranked as only the 
36th largest export market for U.S. goods and 93rd for imports. Major U.S. exports include oil and 
mostly capital- and technology-intensive manufactured goods such as aircraft, pharmaceuticals, 
machinery, medical equipment, and motor vehicles. 
Table 3. U.S.-Panama Merchandise Trade, 2010 
(top 10 U.S. exports and imports by $ value and as % of total) 
U.S. Exports $ Value million 
% of  
Total U.S. Imports 
$ Value 
million 
% of  
Total 
1. Oil (not crude) 2,459.9 40.5 1. Repaired Goods 131.1 34.6 
2. Machinery 532.9 8.8 2. Fish/Seafood 85.4 22.5 
3. Electrical mach. 426.6 7.0 3. Gold 59.8 15.8 
4. Aircraft 396.7 6.5 4. Edible Fruit 20.6 5.4 
5. Repaired Goods 272.8 4.5 5. Sugar 18.1 4.8 
6. Vehicles 229.4 3.8 6. Perfume 8.5 2.2 
7. Cereals 145.0 2.4 7. Coffee 7.9 2.1 
8. Optical/Med. Equip 130.7 2.2 8. Electrical mach. 5.7 1.5 
9. Perfume 107.9 1.8 9. Aluminum 5.1 1.4 
10. Plastics 98.5 1.6 10. Machinery 5.1 1.4 
Other 1,268.4 20.9 Other  31.5 8.3 
Total 6,068.9 100.0 Total 378.8 100.0 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce data presented by Global Trade Atlas. 
The United States imports relatively little from Panama, accounting for the growing U.S. 
merchandise trade surplus. Most imports are primary products; 23% is seafood, mostly fresh fish 
and shrimp. Repaired goods account for 35% of total imports from Panama.28 Commodity trade 
includes crude oil, precious metal (mostly gold), fruit, sugar, and coffee, which together account 
for one-third of total imports. Unlike the Central American countries, where U.S. sensitivities to 
textile and apparel trade run high, Panama trades little in this sector. Panama’s agricultural 
exports, particularly sugar, presented the more difficult negotiation issue. 
U.S. Foreign Direct Investment 
Panama has no formal restrictions on capital flows, does not discriminate between foreign and 
domestic investment, and maintains bilateral investment treaties with the United States and many 
European countries. Critics have pointed out, however, that the legal environment can be 
cumbersome and that Panama’s relatively high labor costs (for the hemisphere) and inflexible 
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labor laws can be a frustration if not an impediment to U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI).29 
Still, U.S. companies are well represented in Panama, including the largest container port facility 
in the region, multiple financial institutions, transportation firms, and manufacturing facilities 
from various sectors. Like other countries pursuing an FTA with the United States, Panama seeks 
closer ties for the continued FDI that may be generated from having a permanent rules-based 
trade relationship with a large trading partner. 
U.S. FDI represents over a third of total FDI in Panama. Table 4 compares U.S. FDI in Panama to 
other regional destinations. The dollar value of U.S. investment in Panama is often nearly equal to 
or higher than that in the five Central American countries combined, and amounts to over 25% of 
Panama’s GDP, compared to only 6% for Central America. Plans to widen and improve the canal 
will likely provide an opportunity for some $5 billion of investment in the canal itself, and 
perhaps related large amounts of FDI for other sectors of the economy with a significant U.S. 
presence. 
Table 4. U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Panama, Mexico, and Central America 
($ millions) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Panama 5,141 5,842 5,409 4,919 4,826 4,636 6,509 6,236 7,845 
Mexico 52,544 56,303 59,851 63,384 73,687 82,965 91,259 89,610 97,897 
Central 
America 2,994 3,199 2,333 4,884 3,902 3,595 5,315 8,282 8,051 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. BEA website. Data are stock of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) presented on a historical-cost basis. 
Summary of Trade Negotiations and the Proposed 
U.S.-Panama FTA30 
Panama approached the United States for a stand-alone FTA, preferring to avoid a direct link to 
the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). Panama 
wanted to maximize an FTA’s potential to win U.S. congressional approval by emphasizing the 
historical and strategic nature of the U.S.-Panamanian relationship, while separating the 
negotiations from the divisive CAFTA-DR accord. Panama’s service economy, small textile and 
apparel industry, and limited integration with the Central American economies also bolstered the 
case for separate negotiations.31 Another unique feature of the FTA negotiations was the treatment 
of business issues with respect to the Panama Canal Area. Its status as an autonomous legal entity 
under the Panamanian Constitution required separate negotiations for government procurement, 
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labor, investment, and other areas. The United States is the only country with which Panama has 
been willing to negotiate issues related to the canal area in an FTA. 
The proposed agreement was completed in 10 rounds of negotiation, concluding on December 16, 
2006, and in general follows the text framework of earlier FTAs. It was signed on June 28, 2007, 
following some significant last minute changes to the labor, environment, intellectual property 
rights, and government procurement chapters to accommodate new commitments agreed to by the 
USTR and bipartisan congressional leadership. Market access schedules, drawn from previous 
FTA templates, reflect both U.S. and Panamanian interests, as do other market access provisions. 
Congress requires that the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) make an 
economic assessment of the potential impact of an FTA on the U.S. economy. The analysis 
usually is done with both a general equilibrium model to estimate economy-wide changes and a 
partial equilibrium model to estimate sector or industry-level changes. In Panama’s case, there 
was insufficient data to make a meaningful estimate from a general equilibrium model, and so 
detailed estimates of how the FTA might affect U.S. economic growth, employment, trade, and 
income were not offered. In general, however, through other quantitative and qualitative 
indicators, the USITC concluded that because Panama’s economy is very small relative to that of 
the United States, the likely overall effect on the U.S. economy will be similarly very small.32 
At the sector level, the USITC finds that the “main effect” of the FTA would likely be to increase 
U.S. exports, while causing little growth in U.S. imports from Panama. In general, the estimates 
are in line with general expectations based on (1) the small amount of goods imported from 
Panama; (2) the small production capacity of Panama; and (3) the fact that most imports from 
Panama (96% by value) already enter the United States duty free through either normal trade 
relations (NTR) or preferences provided by the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) programs or the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).33 
Detailed estimates suggest that when fully implemented, the largest growth potentially will 
accrue to U.S. exports of rice (145%), pork (96%), beef (94%), and passenger vehicles (43%). 
Again, these would amount to a very small dollar value increase given that, with the exception of 
rice, the U.S. exports of these goods to Panama represent less than two-tenths of one percent 
(0.2%) of U.S. exports to the world and even a smaller portion of U.S. production. With respect to 
the services provisions in the FTA, they exceed WTO commitments, but the gains for U.S. 
providers are also expected to be small, with the potential for further gains once the Panama 
Canal expansion project is fully underway.34 
Below is a more detailed discussion of the major negotiation areas and an analysis of the issues 
that have been of particular interest to Panama and the United States, including the U.S. 
Congress. Where relevant, changes made pursuant to the May 10, 2007, bipartisan New Trade 
Policy for America are highlighted. 
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Market Access 
Market access (chapter 3 of the FTA) covers provisions that govern barriers to trade such as 
tariffs, quotas, safeguards, other nontariff barriers, and rules of origin (chapter 4). The proposed 
U.S.-Panama FTA would replace duty-free treatment extended selectively by unilateral trade 
preferences provided to Panama under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), 
the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), and the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP), under which most Panamanian goods enter the United States duty free.35 Panamanian 
agricultural products, however, do face some of the highest barriers, particularly sugar, which is 
subject to a tariff rate quota (TRQ). Panama levies an average tariff of 7% on U.S. industrial and 
consumer goods, with tariff peaks of 81% for some goods. The average tariff on U.S. agricultural 
goods is 15%, with peaks as high as 260% on one product.36 Imports also face an additional 5% 
transfer tax, which applies to domestic goods as well. 
Market access provides for national treatment for traded goods of both parties, with a detailed 
schedule defining the progressive elimination of customs duties for manufactured and agricultural 
goods. There are nine staging categories that classify each country’s goods based on the time to 
tariff elimination, with the most sensitive products given lengthier phase-out of tariffs. The USTR 
reports that tariffs on 88% of industrial and commercial goods would go to zero immediately, 
with the remaining tariffs phased out over a 10-year period. Similarly, up to two-thirds of U.S. 
farm exports would receive immediate duty free treatment.37 Tariffs on some agricultural goods 
would remain in place longer, with some taking up to 17 years to be completely eliminated (20 
years for rice). Safeguards have been retained for many products only for the period of duty 
phase-out, but antidumping and countervailing duties were not addressed, leaving these trade 
remedy laws fully operational, as required under TPA. 
Rules of origin define which goods would be eligible for duty-free treatment based on the country 
of origin of their content. Rules of origin are intended to prevent transshipment of goods made 
from materials originating in countries outside the agreement. They are particularly pertinent to 
apparel and textile trade, of which there is very little exported from Panama 
Agricultural Trade 
The United States has a small, but positive agricultural trade balance with Panama. Agriculture 
accounts for 9% of total U.S. merchandise exports to Panama, and the United States captures 
some 51% of the Panamanian agricultural import market. While the average tariff on U.S. 
agricultural products is 15%, tariffs can peak as high as 260% for chicken leg quarters.38 Because 
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both countries have products they wished to protect, agriculture market access was one of the 
most difficult issues to resolve. 
U.S. domestic agricultural support programs are not addressed in the proposed FTA, which 
focused on tariff reduction, quota definitions, and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) rules and 
enforcement measures. Market access was particularly difficult for four highly protected 
products: pork; poultry; rice; and sugar. The United States was basically “offensive” on pork, 
poultry, and rice, expecting to open Panama’s markets further. It was “defensive” on sugar, 
attempting to limit increases in the sugar quota that might disrupt operations of the U.S. sugar 
program as defined in legislation. Panama’s position was the reverse, pressing to minimize 
increases in U.S. exports of pork, poultry, and rice, and to increase its sugar export quota. 
The U.S. sugar program reflects a historical commitment to protect the income of sugar beet, 
sugar cane, and sugar processing firms with below-prime-rate loans, limitations on sales in the 
domestic market, and tariff rate quotas (TRQs). TRQs restrict imports with prohibitively high 
tariffs on imports above a defined quota amount, as permitted under WTO rules. In fiscal year 
2008, the above-quota tariff rate was estimated to be 86% on raw cane sugar and 76% on refined 
sugar.39 For comparative purposes, on average, Panama harvests only a quarter of the sugar 
produced by each of the five Central American countries, but it still plays a disproportionally 
important role in the Panamanian agricultural sector. Sugar constitutes a third of Panama’s total 
agricultural exports, compared to less than 10% for the Central American countries, and 41% of 
agricultural exports to the United States. The U.S. market consumes 76% of Panamanian sugar 
exports, compared to less than 10% of sugar exports from Central America. 
Given the dependence of Panamanian sugar producers on the U.S. market, in part driven by the 
industry’s relatively high wage rates that make it cost prohibitive to produce for the world market, 
the Panamanians argued that even a relatively small quantitative increase in their portion of the 
U.S. sugar quota would have a large benefit for their industry. The U.S. sugar industry, however, 
continued to resist the inclusion of sugar in bilateral FTAs, arguing that the WTO is the forum for 
addressing domestic support programs and TRQs in the agricultural sector. 
For Panama, pork, rice, and poultry were the most sensitive products. These are also protected by 
TRQs, with in-quota tariffs of 15% and out-of-quota tariffs rising to 74%, 103%, and 273%, 
respectively. Pork and poultry have a special issue related to the consumption of white versus 
dark meat. The United States consumes considerably more white meat than dark, leaving a 
disproportional amount of dark cuts for export, which face the highest tariffs. In Panama, as with 
much of the world, dark meat is preferred. The concern revolved around U.S. producers’ 
willingness to sell dark meat cuts at a low price in foreign markets, putting downward pressure on 
prices and hurting domestic producers in those countries. The Panamanians argued that because 
of the relatively high profit margins on white meat in the United States, on a cost allocation basis, 
U.S. producers can actually afford to sell the dark meat at below cost. The cost accounting can be 
debated, but concerns over the price effect in the Panamanian market remained unchanged. 
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Panama’s rice industry, which supplies over 90% of the domestic demand, also argued that 
opening the market to U.S. subsidized rice would decimate their industry, which, because of its 
protection, sells rice considerably above the world price. In fact, the USITC report estimates that 
when fully implemented, the FTA will have the greatest impact on U.S. rice exports. Although the 
rice provisions will not be fully implemented until year 20 of the agreement, for milled rice, the 
TRQ for the first year will be 20 times the current level of U.S. exports to Panama, which may be 
expected to affect rice growers shortly after implementation, perhaps causing them to shift 
production to other crops, or leave farming for alternative employment.40 
Panamanian agriculture represents only 6% of GDP, but 17% of employment. These numbers 
point to both an inherent inefficiency, due in part to protection, but also the strong role agriculture 
plays in supporting rural employment and social stability. Agriculture’s 17% of national 
employment actually supports 40% of the country’s population living in rural areas, most of 
whom exist at or below the poverty line. Given the potential to dislocate much of the poor in the 
country, the Panamanians argued that opening the agricultural sector too quickly to the large 
production capacity of the United States would have been highly detrimental to the social 
structure of the rural economy, leading to increased unemployment, poverty, and rural-urban 
migration. For these reasons, Panama wanted a slow transition to open markets in the agriculture 
sector, as well as an increase in the sugar quota to boost employment. This would also buy time 
for Panama to develop its non-traditional export crops, such as melons, palm oil, and pineapples, 
which some view as the future of this sector. 
The compromise struck in the proposed FTA would provide duty-free treatment for over half of 
U.S. farm exports to Panama including high quality beef, poultry products, soybeans, most fresh 
fruits, and a number of processed goods. Remaining tariffs would be phased out between years 7 
and 17 of the FTA. Rice tariffs, which protect one of Panama’s most sensitive products, would 
remain in place until year 20 of the FTA. U.S. exports of rice and other products would receive 
expanded quotas under the Panamanian tariff rate quota system. The United States agreed to give 
Panama an additional 7,000 metric tons of sugar imports in the first year under a three-tiered 
TRQ system, which would grow by 1% per year, capped eventually for some types of sugar.41 
Other protective measures for agriculture were negotiated. Whereas export subsidies, voluntary 
restrain agreements (VREs), and import licensing are generally prohibited, TRQs, safeguards, and 
a sugar compensation mechanism would be allowed. The sugar mechanism gives the United 
States the option to compensate Panamanian sugar producers in lieu of giving Panamanian their 
exports duty-free treatment. This option might be employed if the U.S. sugar program were 
threatened with disruption. 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) 
SPS was one of the most difficult issues to resolve. Although understood as necessary to ensure 
the safety of agricultural imports, SPS standards can be a burden, and are often denounced as a 
veiled form of protectionism. Panama’s SPS standards, on the whole, are considered to be very 
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high and meet or exceed WTO standards. The USTR, however, has long raised concerns over 
procedural transparency with respect to phytosanitary permits and also Panama’s requirement that 
imports of poultry, beef, and pork, its most protected products, come from processing plants that 
have been individually inspected by Panamanian officials. The United States contends that this 
process has often been cumbersome, drawn out, and ultimately very costly to U.S. producers.42 
The United States wanted Panama to recognize the USDA certification process as equivalent to 
Panamanian standards for the purpose of securing unimpeded entry of U.S. meat exports. This 
issue became highly controversial during the ninth round of negotiations, when U.S. negotiators 
proposed this agreement be put into a formal side letter. Panama responded by noting that the SPS 
chapter had already been closed, that its meat inspection standards are among the highest in the 
world, and that a last minute effort to change SPS provisions raised sovereignty issues in Panama 
by potentially requiring Panama to lower its standards in some cases.43 
As part of the resolution, Panamanian officials visited the United States to review the food safety 
inspection system for meat and poultry and found that accepting the U.S. system would pose no 
sanitary threat to Panama. This understanding was formalized in a separate bilateral agreement 
between the two countries, along with a streamlined import documentation system. Signed and 
entered into force on December 20, 2006, the agreement states that for meat, poultry, dairy, and 
other processed products, Panama agrees to accept U.S. sanitary, phytosanitary, and regulatory 
systems as equivalent to those of Panama and will no longer require individual plant inspections. 
Panama has since amended its laws accordingly.44 
Textiles and Apparel 
In general, textiles and apparel make for difficult market access negotiations, but Panama 
produces very little of these goods. The proposed FTA would provide immediate duty-free access 
for all textile and apparel goods, subject to rules of origin (requiring use of fabric and yarn 
produced in Panama or the United States).45 The permanence of the provisions and more 
accommodating measures provide a benefit to the small Panamanian industry. Safeguard 
measures would allow duties to increase on imports in which a sudden increase in volume either 
threatens or actually harms U.S. producers. The text also provides for short supply lists of fabrics, 
yarns, and fibers that otherwise would face duties. The market access provisions were not the 
major apparel issue. Because Panama is a huge transshipment point for international trade and has 
its own duty free zone, the main concern was to assure U.S. apparel producers that there would be 
effective customs cooperation to deter illegal transshipment of goods that do not meet rules of 
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origin. There is an extensive provision on consultation, monitoring, and onsite visit procedures in 
support of adhering to the rules of origin.46 
Government Procurement 
Transparency in the bidding process for government contracts was listed as one of the most 
important issues by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Panama.47 Some of the concerns 
expressed were addressed in the 2006 amendments to the procurement law, which codified 
advancements such as allowing use of Internet procurement. These changes modernized and 
made more transparent procurement regulations, government purchasing information, and 
transactions. A separate administrative court for public contracting disputes was also created. 
These changes enhanced Panamanian laws that already require transparency in the bidding 
process. Panama has not acceded to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, which the 
United States has encouraged.48 
The government procurement chapter differs from earlier FTAs by stating that a firm’s adherence 
to “acceptable” environmental and labor standards may be included as a standard in the bidding 
and procurement process. The technical specifications article states that it is not intended to 
preclude a procuring entity from using technical specifications to promote conservation of natural 
resources, or to require a supplier to comply with generally applicable laws regarding 
fundamental principles and rights to work; and acceptable conditions of work with respect to 
minimum wages, hours of work and occupation safety and health in the territory in which the 
good is produced or the service is performed. 
Government procurement takes on a greater importance when considered in light of the Panama 
Canal expansion and related prospects for large long-term investments. The Panama Canal 
Authority (PCA) operates independently of the national government and Panama required 
separate negotiation apart from the regular government procurement chapter. Panama negotiated 
to maintain the canal authority dispute settlement system within the proposed FTA, as well as to 
keep small business set aside provisions for Panamanian firms. In addition, for 12 years after the 
agreement takes effect, Panama may set aside contracts let by the PCA to Panamanian firms 
subject to clear notice of intent to do so and limitations on the size of contracts. The text 
otherwise addresses U.S. concerns over nondiscriminatory, fair, and open government 
procurement procedures for all national government authorities. Like the PCA, subnational 
governments (e.g., states and municipalities) are not required to uphold the government 
procurement provisions, but those willing to do so appear in an appendix of the proposed FTA. 
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Investment 
Panama has a well-developed financial services industry to support the flow of capital and is an 
important regional financial center. U.S. firms invest heavily in Panama relative to other Latin 
American countries, and a permanent rules-based trade agreement may be seen as enhancing this 
relationship. Panama signed a bilateral investment treaty with the United States in 1991, the first 
in the region, which includes investor-state provisions and further guarantees of the free flow of 
transfers under a 1998 law. Although the Panamanian government has been responsive to U.S. 
foreign investment interests, concerns have arisen in particular cases involving investment in 
highly regulated industries. Resolution of these concerns facilitated the FTA negotiations and the 
potential exists for further significant foreign investment in Panama, including the canal 
expansion and reverted areas of the former canal zone.49 
The FTA text provides for clear and enforceable rules for foreign investments, which is largely 
accomplished by “standard” language (identical to the CAFTA-DR) requiring national and most-
favored-nation (nondiscriminatory) treatment. It further clarifies rules on expropriation (including 
indirect expropriation) and compensation, investor-state dispute settlement, and the expeditious 
free flow of payments and transfers related to investments, with certain exceptions in cases 
subject to legal proceedings (e.g., bankruptcy, insolvency, criminal activity). Transparent and 
impartial dispute settlement procedures provide recourse to investors. 
Two investment issues stand out. First is the investor-state provision, which was controversial 
during the CAFTA-DR debate, but is commonly used in U.S. bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
and in earlier FTAs. It allows investors alleging a breach in investment obligations to seek 
binding arbitration against the state through the dispute settlement mechanism defined in the 
Investment Chapter. U.S. investors have long supported the inclusion of investor-state rules to 
ensure that they have recourse in countries that may lack the institutional capacity to adequately 
protect the rights of foreign investors. Since bilateral investment treaties usually have been made 
with developing countries that have little foreign investment in the United States, it was not 
anticipated that these provisions would be applied in the United States. Circumstances changed 
under NAFTA, when investor-state provisions gave rise to numerous “indirect expropriation” 
claims against subnational (state) governments in the United States, Mexico, and Canada over 
environmental and other regulations.50 
Although none of the claims filed against the United States has prevailed, Congress instructed in 
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation that future trade agreements ensure “that foreign 
investors in the United States are not accorded greater substantive rights with respect to 
investment protections than United States investors.” In response, Annex 10-B of the proposed 
U.S.-Panama FTA states that “except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions 
by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate welfare objectives, such as public 
health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.” This provision, 
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along with one that allows for early elimination of “frivolous” suits, is intended to address these 
concerns, although some stakeholders remain skeptical.51 
Second, Annex 10-F of the proposed FTA seeks to reserve certain rights with respect to disputes 
filed under Section - B of the investment chapter that may affect the Panama Canal Authority 
(PCA). First, Annex 10-F clarifies that Panama has sole authority over the canal and its 
operations, and should a claim be made against the PCA, the dispute tribunal “may not order 
attachment or enjoin the application of a measure that has been adopted or maintained by the 
Panama Canal Authority in pursuance of” its responsibility for the canal. Second, a claim arising 
from acts of the PCA that alleges a breach of the investment agreement must first be made to the 
PCA, where it will have three months to respond before the claim may be made to the dispute 
settlement panel under the proposed FTA. 
Services 
Services trade was negotiated in multiple chapters and includes financial services, shipping, 
telecommunications, professional services, and e-commerce. Panama is a service-based economy, 
has many competitive services industries, and is known for its “open regulatory environment for 
services.” In general, the FTA provides for market access commitments in services that exceeds 
the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). With the possible exception of future 
canal expansion projects, the USITC estimates that the new commitments, although important 
changes, will have only a small economic impact on U.S. providers.52 
Panama requires local licensing for many professionals to practice in the country, which the 
United States wanted to change, but was only partially successful in some cases (e.g., lawyers). 
Panama was the first country in Latin America to pass e-commerce legislation. It recognizes the 
legal standing of electronic transactions and provides for the creation of an oversight agency. The 
United States pressed for even greater transparency in regulatory procedures and U.S. business 
groups identified services as a critical negotiating area given U.S. competitive advantages and the 
large services sector in Panama.53 
Equal ability to compete in retail trade, express delivery, and financial services, including 
insurance and portfolio management, was achieved in the proposed FTA, an issue of primary 
importance to the United States. In particular, restrictions on investment in retail trade and access 
to contracts let by the Panama Canal Authority were either eliminated or reduced. Greater access 
to other professional services and transparency in licensing and other accreditation were clarified. 
To the extent that restrictions in these areas are reduced, U.S. firms are better able to compete in 
the largest sector of the Panamanian economy, the one most likely to grow with canal expansion 
and increased merchandise trade through the canal. Panama wanted greater transparency in the 
U.S. state-level financial services regulatory system to help ease the possible opening of 
Panamanian banks in select U.S. states. The United States government argued, however, that it 
was unable to make commitments on state-level financial services regulatory matters. 
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Intellectual Property Rights 
Strengthening intellectual property rights (IPR) was a major U.S. priority, in particular by 
harmonizing standards at U.S. levels, and by securing Panama’s commitment to join an array of 
international agreements related to IPR protection. The most contentious IPR issues revolved 
around patent and data exclusivity issues related to pharmaceutical products, but recently, Internet 
piracy has become a serious problem. 
The USTR reports that Panama’s IPR laws and institutional support have improved with the 
creation of courts dedicated specifically to IPR cases. Panama updated its patent law in 1996 and 
has a law governing trademark protection. Panama signed on to the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonographs Treaty. The 1994 
copyright law improved protection and increased the options to prosecute violators. The United 
States continues to encourage Panama to accede to additional IPR treaties, as now required in the 
proposed FTA, and to remain vigilant in its antipiracy commitment, a primary concern given the 
large amount of goods that are shipped through the Canal Free Zone.54 
IPR provisions in the proposed FTA exceed those in the WTO. They provide that all businesses 
receive equal treatment and that Panama ratify or accede to various international IP agreements. 
Trademark registration is better enforced through a transparent online process and special system 
to resolve disputes over Internet domain issues, among other requirements. Copyright provisions 
clarify use of digital materials (exceeding TRIPS standards) including rights over temporary 
copies of works on computers (music, videos, software, text), sole author rights for making their 
work available online, extended terms of protection for copyrighted materials, strong anti-
circumvention provisions to prohibit tampering with technologies, the requirement that 
governments use only legitimate computer software, the prohibition of unauthorized receipt or 
distribution of encrypted satellite signals, and rules for liability of Internet service providers for 
copyright infringement. Patents and trade secrets rules conform more closely with U.S. norms. 
End-user piracy is criminalized and all parties are required to authorize the seizure, forfeiture, and 
destruction of counterfeit and pirated goods. The text also mandates statutory damages for abuse 
of copyrighted material.55 
Pharmaceutical Issues 
The proposed U.S.-Panama FTA adopts new IPR pharmaceutical standards that reflect a 
bipartisan understanding as developed by congressional leadership and the USTR in the May 10, 
2007, New Trade Policy for America. They affect three important issues. The first and perhaps 
most complicated issue is data exclusivity. To bring a patented drug to market, a drug company 
must demonstrate through clinical trials that the drug is both safe and effective, a time-consuming 
and costly process. Under U.S. law, the data used to establish these claims are protected for a 
period of five years from the time the patented drug is approved for use in a country’s market, the 
so-called data exclusivity term. Under this protection, regulatory agencies cannot use these data 
or rely on references to such data in the certification of a generic version of the medicine or drug 
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until the data exclusivity period ends. This issue was raised by Members of Congress during the 
CAFTA-DR debate, but was only partially addressed in a side agreement (“understanding”) 
assuring that relevant WTO rules would be in force. Critics, however, wanted the side agreement 
to include an explicit exception to the data protection requirement for cases where compulsory 
licensing under the WTO rules might be invoked, and to include the language in the body of the 
FTA.56 
Congressional input led to significant changes to the Panama text. The IPR chapter provides that 
if a company files to bring to market a new drug in a foreign country (e.g., Panama), and the 
foreign regulatory agency relies on marketing approval of the initial filing in the home country 
(e.g., the United States) for approval in Panama, and the Panamanian regulatory agency approves 
the drug within six months of that filing, the data exclusivity term begins at the time the drug was 
approved in the United States, not Panama. This provision is intended to speed the entry of 
generic drugs into Panama’s market by encouraging both drug companies and foreign 
governments to engage in the approval process as efficiently as possible. Because the six-month 
rule effectively reduces the data exclusivity term in Panama, drug companies are encouraged to 
file as soon as feasible to maximize the time their data may be protected in Panama after 
receiving market approval. Because countries must approve within the sixth-month rule to benefit 
from it, they are encouraged to put in place an efficient drug certification process.57 
In addition, there is language in the IPR chapter stating that in cases such as epidemics, extreme 
urgency or national emergency, and other cases of public non-commercial use, a waiver from the 
data exclusivity laws would be allowed. The WTO public health provisions allow for compulsory 
licensing, circumventing patents in public health emergencies or other circumstances of public 
use deemed necessary. In the case of the U.S.-Panama FTA, which requires a period of data 
exclusivity not mandated by the WTO, the waiver is extended to the data exclusivity term as well. 
A second issue is patent term restoration, which allows for the retroactive application of patents 
in cases where the approval process for a patent extends beyond some legal- or regulatory-
determined standard period of time. Although there are provisions that require term restoration for 
patents in general, in the case of pharmaceutical products, term extension is only optional. 
The third issue is patent linkage. This term refers to linking the sanitary registration process 
(done, for example, by the Food and Drug Administration in the United States) with the patent 
registration process. U.S. firms effectively wanted mandatory linkage that would automatically 
check for patent infringement when an application for bringing a drug to market is made in a 
foreign country sanitary registration office. The Panama agreement was amended to make patent 
linkage voluntary, and allows for administrative or judicial remedies to expedite patent 
challenges. 
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Public health advocates have long pushed for re-balancing international rules in ways that would 
facilitate the introduction of lower cost generic equivalents into developing countries. The revised 
IPR chapter in the Panama FTA supports congressional interest in pursuing this goal, although not 
to the full satisfaction of some public health advocates. Pharmaceutical companies, by contrast, 
lobbied against these changes, arguing that they bear their full cost through cumbersome 
administration and lost revenue by the earlier introduction of generic competition. They further 
argued that they count on this revenue to offset the high costs of research and development that 
allows new drugs to be properly tested and approved in the first place. 
Labor and Environment 
Labor and environmental provisions have been highly contentious issues in trade agreements, 
with considerable disagreement in Congress and elsewhere over how aggressive language in trade 
agreements should be in accommodating these concerns. An important aspect of the proposed 
U.S.-Panama FTA is that it adopts new standards for both the labor and environment chapters that 
reflect a 2007 bipartisan understanding as developed by congressional leadership and the USTR. 
Despite the bipartisan nature of the agreement, some Members continue to express reservations 
about the effectiveness of labor provisions, as well as the overall benefits of bilateral FTAs. 
The debate over labor and environmental standards reflects differences in both economic and 
political perspectives. From an economic perspective, it has been argued that developing country 
firms may have an “unfair” competitive advantage because their lower standards are a basis for 
their lower costs, which in turn are reflected in lower prices for goods that may compete with 
those produced in developed countries.58 It follows from this argument that the difference in costs 
may be an inducement to move U.S. investment and jobs abroad. In addition, critics have also 
argued that trade agreements should not support production standards that lead to unacceptable 
working conditions or severe environmental degradation. 
On the other hand, some studies have suggested that cost differentials are usually not high enough 
to determine business location alone, and that productivity is the more important factor.59 Further, 
many economists view trade liberalization as part of the overall development process that, in and 
of itself, can promote improved social and economic conditions over the long run.60 Developing 
countries are also concerned with the possible loss of sovereignty should specific standards be 
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defined in trade agreements, as well as with the possibility that such provisions can be misused as 
a disguised form of protectionism. 
Labor Issues 
Preliminary drafts of the U.S.-Panama FTA adopted the CAFTA-DR labor chapter language 
verbatim. Many Members of Congress and others objected to four key aspects of this language. 
First, it emphasized that a country must effectively “enforce its own labor laws,” rather than 
define specific labor standards to be codified and enforced.61 Second, this was the only provision 
in the labor chapter subject to the FTA’s labor dispute resolution process (other commitments 
were unenforceable). Third, labor (and environment) provisions had their own dispute settlement 
mechanism separate from the process used for commercial and other disputes. Critics charged 
that the labor dispute mechanism was inferior for many reasons. Fourth, language that required 
Parties to the agreement only to “strive to ensure” that they do not waive or derogate from their 
labor law commitments was considered both inadequate and unenforceable. 
In short, there existed a basic criticism that the labor provisions in the bilateral FTAs did not 
reflect the intent of Congress in defining labor negotiating objectives in Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA) legislation, were a step backward in U.S. policy on this issue that conditions 
trade benefits on meeting basic ILO labor commitments as defined in the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI) and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), and were effectively 
meaningless without a credible enforcement mechanism.62 
Although supporters of the CAFTA-DR model prevailed in earlier agreements, a new bipartisan 
consensus emerged with the 110th Congressional leadership that led to a significantly changed 
model for bilateral FTA labor chapters. The principles of this change, as defined in the May 10, 
2007, agreement, were incorporated into the labor chapters for proposed U.S. bilateral FTAs with 
Panama, Peru, Colombia, and South Korea. The major changes from the CAFTA-DR model state 
that each country: 
• shall adopt and maintain in its statutes, regulations and practices as rights, the 
five core ILO labor principles: freedom of association; the effective recognition 
of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of compulsory or 
forced labor; the effective abolition of child labor and, for purposes of this 
Agreement, a prohibition on the worst forms of child labor; and, the elimination 
of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation; 
• shall not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to do so, in a manner 
affecting trade or investment between the countries in implementing the above 
commitment; 
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• shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws in accordance with the above 
commitment and that each party retains the right to the reasonable exercise of 
discretion in using resources to achieve this goal, provided the exercise of such 
discretion is not inconsistent with the obligations of the chapter, and; 
• will be required to use the dispute settlement process defined for the entire 
agreement (rather than a separate process for labor disputes as defined in the 
CAFTA-DR). 
The change in language is intended to make commitments to ILO basic principles binding and 
enforceable to the same extent as all other commitments in the proposed FTA, including having 
recourse to trade sanctions. The rest of the labor chapter conforms largely to commitments in 
previous bilateral FTAs. These include procedural guarantees of transparency and fairness in the 
use of tribunals to enforce a Party’s labor laws and institutional arrangements that include 
creation of a joint Labor Affairs Council to oversee implementation and review of commitments 
made in the Labor Chapter. A new Labor Cooperation and Capacity Building Mechanism is also 
to be established. 
Panama’s Labor Code and Conditions 
Panama has higher wage rates, stronger labor laws, and fewer impediments to union formation 
than many countries in the region. The business community, including U.S. firms operating in 
Panama, argue that the labor laws are too generous with respect to firing or downsizing the labor 
force, which can actually encourage unintended responses by business, such as extended use of 
temporary workers. In 1970, Panama created the Tripartite Council on Union Freedom and 
Participation in Economic and Social Development with representatives from the government, 
labor, and business. Its primary function is to oversee that workers’ rights are being observed in 
Panama. 
The U.S. State Department notes that Panama’s labor laws guarantee all the ILO basic principles. 
All private-sector and most public-sector employees have the right to organize, bargain 
collectively, and strike (limited for the public sector). In general, major violations of labor laws 
have not been found, but the ILO has raised concerns about a number of ongoing practices. These 
include the widespread use of temporary workers to circumvent the labor code, the minimum 
requirement of 40 workers to form a union, and the use of child labor, particularly in agricultural 
areas during harvest times and for domestic employment. Lax enforcement of health and safety 
standards was also cited as a continuing problem.63 Some of these issues were cited by some 
Members of Congress as needing to be addressed before the FTA could be considered (see 
“Background and Recent Developments”).64 
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Environmental Issues 
Environmental specialists have stressed the need to achieve multiple goals in U.S. reciprocal 
FTAs. These include protecting and assuring strong enforcement of existing domestic 
environmental standards, ensuring that multilateral environmental agreements are not undermined 
by trade rules, promoting strong environmental initiatives to evaluate and raise performance, 
developing a systematic program of capacity-building assistance, and assuring that environmental 
provisions in FTAs are subject to the same dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms as are 
other aspects of the agreements.65 
At issue is identifying and attempting to ameliorate the environmental effects of trade, 
particularly in developing countries that may have weak laws and lax enforcement mechanisms. 
Even among environmental experts, opinions vary. Some have suggested that thus far trade 
agreements have not led to catastrophic pollution nor encouraged a “regulatory race to the 
bottom.” There has also been a certain acknowledged degree of success in having environmental 
issues addressed in the body of FTAs, in side agreements on environmental cooperation, and 
through technical assistance programs, which developing countries can use to respond to specific 
problems. Advocates and many Members of Congress still note that much can be improved, such 
as clarifying obligations, tightening enforcement language, and ensuring that the United States 
allocates financial resources to back up promises of technical assistance.66 
As with the proposed FTA labor chapter, revisions made pursuant to ideas outlined in the May 10, 
2007, arrangement reflect a bipartisan sense of that although the text recognizes sovereign rights 
and responsibilities with respect to the management of natural resources, that trade and 
environmental policies should be mutually supportive and dedicated to the objective of 
sustainable development. The new language, therefore, strengthens the commitments to 
environmental obligations and their enforcement, requiring that each country: 
• adopt, maintain, and implement laws, regulations, and other measures to fulfill 
their obligations under selected multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) 
listed in Annex 18.2; 
• shall not fail to effectively enforce environmental laws and regulations, including 
those adopted as signatories to the MEAs; 
• shall not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer thereto, from such laws 
(replacing the “strive to ensure” language with “shall not”); 
• adopt a commitment to policies that will promote conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity; 
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• subject disputes to the FTA’s overall dispute settlement mechanism rather that a 
mechanism developed solely to deal with labor and environmental disagreements 
that was used in previous FTAs, and; 
• meet obligations for formal cooperation among governments on environmental 
issues and use of the consultation and dispute resolution mechanism in a way that 
is transparent and involves public input.67 
As required under TPA, the USTR conducted an environmental review of the potential 
environmental effects possibly attributable to the proposed FTA. It noted that Panama “faces a 
number of challenges in protecting its environment as it supports its economic and population 
growth.” Deforestation, land degradation, loss of wildlife, and threats to water quality and 
wetlands, among other problems are serious issues for Panama. The Panama Canal also places 
severe water use requirements on the country. Panama has responded through the public policy 
process, establishing environmental standards in law and entering into international and U.S. 
bilateral environmental cooperation agreements.68 These issues were already factors in Panama’s 
development process prior to the negotiation of the proposed FTA. Thus, the environmental 
review maintains that the marginal effects of the proposed FTA on environmental standards 
would be small, whether in terms of projected impacts on the United States or on Panama. 
The environmental review further notes that Panama’s service-oriented economy and the small 
trade volume with the United States are unlikely to be greatly affected by the proposed FTA and 
so will change production and trade little. Still, the FTA may have both positive and negative 
effects. The negative effects of pollution, environmental degradation, and endangering wildlife 
would come mostly from increased agricultural trade and production, which might be addressed 
with increased environmental oversight and policies. The positive effect of the FTA could include 
improvements in environmental standards that may be encouraged by the provisions of the 
agreement and the consultative and cooperation agreements attached to the proposed FTA.69 
Panama’s environmental regulatory agency points out that Panama is increasingly using 
environmental impact studies, but realizes it has enforcement capacity issues that may require 
time to remedy, which could be accommodated in the FTA. 
Trade Capacity Building 
The proposed FTA would create a Committee on Trade Capacity Building (TCB) designed to 
assist Panama with the transition to freer trade with the United States. In general, the committee’s 
mission includes providing technical assistance and coordinating financing to accelerate the 
transition period in expectation of increasing the gains of trade while minimizing the adjustment 
costs. The TCB Committee would help coordinate technical assistance provided by U.S., 
regional, and multilateral agencies in helping Panama meet its obligations under the FTA. 
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Panama prioritized TCB needs in its national trade capacity building strategy. The overriding goal 
is to formulate a strategy that would allow Panama to assume all the commitments under the 
proposed FTA, in the context of also meeting the country’s development needs. The National 
TCB Strategy places strong emphasis on sectoral adjustment strategies, recognizing that some 
industries are already competitive by international standards (e.g., financial services), whereas 
others will need considerable assistance when faced with increased competition from the United 
States (e.g., agriculture). Emphasis is also placed on supporting existing and potentially new 
micro, small, and medium-sized businesses, which may need the most assistance and constitute a 
significant portion of the Panamanian economy, as well as government capacity to administer 
trade-related activities.70 
The major goals identified include inter-sectoral coordination, increasing exports to the United 
States, enhancing the investment climate, better integrating education and innovation into the 
business community, and improving government trade facilitation (processing imports and 
exports.) The strategy identifies 18 action plans covering major trade and trade-related issues, 
ranging from market access and rules of origin, to labor, environment, transparency, and trade 
agreement administration. In each case, the status of Panama’s commitments under the proposed 
FTA is identified along with action items that may need to be pursued to improve capacity in the 
respective area. 
Successful implementation of the strategy, however, requires financial and technical resources 
coordinated among international and U.S. aid agencies. Already in place is a U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) project to support Panama’s transition to more open trade. It 
has two major initiatives: supporting implementation of the proposed FTA and assisting Panama 
with sectoral adjustment to the increased competitiveness arising from international trade. In the 
first case, the USAID project has helped prepare and disseminate a product that explains the 
benefits of the proposed FTA and how Panama might better access the U.S. market with its 
specific products. 
The second initiative focuses on helping three major sectors of the economy, each with a differing 
level of product complexity, to increase their exposure and market share in the United States. 
Specifically, agro-industry, information and communications technology, and artisan products 
were identified as sectors with potential to benefit from the proposed FTA. Sector strategies range 
from targeted product design, to “hands on” assistance in participating in trade fairs, and building 
contacts and linkages with venture capitalists and other key business facilitation professionals.71 
Outlook 
On June 28, 2007, representatives of Panama and the United States signed a reciprocal bilateral 
free trade agreement, establishing a commitment, subject to congressional approval, to more 
liberalized rules on trade and investment between the two countries. Panama’s National Assembly 
ratified the FTA by a vote of 58 to 4 on July 11, 2007. The U.S. Congress has yet to take up the 
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implementing legislation, but the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees have 
held a series of hearings on the proposed FTA. 
Trade policy and trade agreements affect more than commercial ties between countries. For Latin 
America, and in particular for countries in the Caribbean Basin region, U.S. trade arrangements 
historically have been an important part of U.S. foreign economic policy. The proposed U.S.-
Panama FTA is no exception and presents the U.S. Congress with a complex and diverse policy 
challenge. The significance of the proposed U.S.-Panama FTA has not been lost on Congress, as 
exemplified by a vigorous ongoing debate. Votes on FTAs, as on many trade policy matters, 
present difficult choices because they have become increasingly complex and can pit interest 
groups within a state or district against one another. This challenge is made even more difficult at 
a time when doubts over “globalization” and the lingering labor market effects of the 2008 
financial crisis reinforce anxiety over the nation’s economic well being. To the extent that a 
bilateral FTA may be viewed as compromising or directly hurting certain industries, firms, or 
jobs, the arguments favoring specific economic interests face off against those emphasizing 
broader foreign and economic policy goals. 
Often, the significance of such a trade off depends on the specifics of a particular trade 
agreement. The circumstances framing the Panama FTA differ considerably from those of two 
other signed FTAs that may be considered by the 112th Congress. For example, the deep concerns 
that Congress has expressed over Colombia’s violence have not been an issue in the Panama FTA 
debate, which is framed more by the positive image of a long-standing strategic bilateral 
relationship based on Panama’s canal. Nor is Panama easily compared with the proposed FTA 
with South Korea, which as a major U.S. trading partner, can affect key industries such as 
automobile and beef production. To the contrary, Panama trades little with the United States, even 
by Latin American standards, and nearly all Panamanian exports to the United States already 
enter duty free, so the marginal effects of the FTA will not have a major effect on the U.S. 
economy. 
Congress is still debating two major issues: labor and tax transparency. The final text of the 
proposed FTA incorporated specific language on labor defined in the May 10, 2007, 
understanding, resulting in obligations that exceed those in existing multilateral trade rules or 
even contemplated in the Doha Round. As time passed, however, new concerns over Panama’s 
labor code emerged. Panama’s National Assembly addressed all but one with new legislation. 
One issue on minimum workers needed to form a union was not addressed for lack of support 
even among labor groups in Panama. 
Congress has also required that Panama amend its tax laws to incorporate changes necessary to 
implement the recently signed Tax Information and Exchange Agreement (TIEA), which would 
provide greater transparency in support of curbing money laundering activities related to drug 
trafficking. Much of the legislation has been completed, but the National Assembly has not 
completed work on all bills, including a final vote on ratifying the TIEA. It remains to be seen if 
these final changes will be sufficient for the FTA to be approved by a majority in the U.S. 
Congress. 
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Appendix A. Chronology of U.S.-Panama FTA 
Date Milestone 
November 18, 2003 The USTR notifies Congress of President George W. Bush’s intent to enter into 
negotiations on a free trade agreement (FTA) with the Republic of Panama. 
April 26-29, 2004 First round of negotiations occurs in Panama City. 
June 11-15, 2004 Second round of negotiations takes place in Los Angeles. 
July 12-16, 2004 Third round of negotiations held in Panama City. 
August 9-12, 2004 Fourth round of negotiations held in Tampa. 
October 18-22, 2004 Fifth round of negotiations takes place in Panama City. 
December 6-10, 2004 Sixth round of negotiations held in Washington, DC. 
January 10-15, 2005 Seventh round of negotiations held in Washington, DC. 
Jan. 31-Feb. 6, 2005 Eighth round of negotiations occurs in Washington, DC. 
Jan. 17-20, 2006 Ninth round of negotiations held in Washington, DC. 
Dec. 16, 2006 Tenth and final round of negotiations concludes in Washington, DC. Chapters on labor 
and environment left open. 
March 30, 2007 President Bush formally notifies Congress of his intention to sign the proposed U.S.-
Panama FTA. 
April 27, 2007 USTR transmits to the White House and Congress 27 trade advisory reports on the 
U.S.-Panama FTA. 
May 10, 2007 Congressional leadership and Bush Administration agree to change labor, environment, 
investment, and intellectual property rights chapters in this and other FTAs based on 
principles outlined in a bipartisan agreement. 
June 28, 2007 The United States and Panama sign a free trade agreement at the Organization of 
American States in Washington, DC. 
July 2, 2007 USTR releases final text of proposed U.S.-Panama FTA. 
July 11, 2007 Panama’s National Assembly approves U.S.-Panama FTA 58-4. 
November 30, 2010 United States and Panama sign a Tax Information and Exchange Agreement (TIEA). 
January 25, 2011 House Ways and Means Committee holds hearing on proposed U.S. free trade 
agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. 
March 9, 2011 Senate Finance Committee holds hearing on proposed U.S. free trade agreements with 
Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. 
March 30, 2011 House Ways and Means Committee holds hearing on proposed U.S. free trade 
agreement with Panama. 
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Appendix B. Panama: Selected Economic Indicators 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
GDP Growth (%) 2.7 0.6 2.2 4.2 7.5 7.2 8.5 12.1 10.7 2.4 
Per Capita GDP Growth (%) 0.8 -1.3 0.4 2.3 5.6 5.3 6.7 10.2 8.9 0.8 
Unemployment Rate (urban %) 13.5 14.0 13.5 13.1 11.8 9.8 8.7 6.4 5.6 6.6 
Inflation – CPI (%) 0.7 0.0 1.9 1.4 -0.2 3.4 2.2 6.4 6.8 1.9 
Current Acct. Bal. (% GDP) -5.8 -1.4 -0.8 -4.5 -7.1 -4.9 -3.1 -7.3 -11.5 0.0 
Terms of Trade (2000=100) 100.0 102.7 101.6 97.2 95.3 93.5 90.8 90.0 85.9 94.0 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean. Estudio económico de 
América Latina y el Caribe, 2008-2009. July 2009, supplemented by ECLAC online statistics. 
a. FDI = net investment or direct foreign investment in Panama minus Panamanian direct investment abroad. 
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